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PROF. KEVIN H. GOVERN 
 
Smart Power for Hard Problems:  
The Role of Special Operation Forces 
Strengthening the Rule of Law  
and Human Rights in Africa 
 
ABSTRACT: 
This article will assess the roles and responsibilities 
of Special Operations Forces (SOF) within the newly 
created U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) as an active 
proponent of a so-called “smart power” national security 
strategy.  In particular, it will outline the economic, 
political, and military challenges faced in Africa; 
specifically, how and why SOCAFRICA is the U.S. force 
of choice for promoting human rights and rule of law in 
Africa.  With the goals of the U.S. military in mind, 
questions will necessarily arise as to “what success looks 
like” for both the U.S. and African nations, and the roles of 
each in joint and combined civil–military initiatives.  The 
concluding comments reflect on how these forces must 
model “what right looks like,” and provide specific 
modeling failures, and the consequences when that 
modeling did not take place. 
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I. Special Operations Command —Africa 
(SOCAFRICA) and “Smart Power” 
 
The U.S.’ AFRICOM just celebrated its fifth 
anniversary in October 2012 of “standing up” operations 
and has progressed well beyond “initial operating 
capability”
1
 to act as the U.S.  Department of Defense’s 
(DoD’s) newest regional unified combatant command
2
 in a 
region of tremendous potential as well as turmoil.  
AFRICOM was conceived to work closely with the African 
Union (AU),
3
 other regional African institutions, and 
individual nations in order to “provide unique ‘value-
added’ capabilities to enhance already existing U.S. and 
                                                           
1
 U.S. AFRICOM PUB. AFF. OFF., U.S. Africa Command Reaches 
Initial Operating Capability, U.S. AFR. COMMAND (Oct. 1, 2007), 
http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1462.  
2
 At the time of this chapter’s writing there were 10 Unified Combatant 
Commands (UCCs) within the U.S. Department of Defense; four were 
organized as functional commands with specific capabilities like 
Special Operations, as in the case of USSOCOM, and six geographical 
commands with regional responsibilities like U.S. Africa Command 
(USAFRICOM). See U.S. Dep’t. of Def., U.S. Joint Publication No. 1-
02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms, RA.DEFENSE.GOV, 384 (2001), 
http://ra.defense.gov/documents/rtm/jp1_02.pdf (“unified combatant 
command — See unified command. (JP 1); unified command — A 
command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander 
and composed of significant assigned components of two or more 
Military Departments that is established and so designated by the 
President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and 
assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called 
unified combatant command. See also combatant command; 
subordinate unified command. (JP 1).”). 
3
 Jim Lobe, Africa to Get Its Own U.S. Military Command, ANTIWAR 





  As “the military’s first ‘smart 
power’ command … [AFRICOM has] no assigned troops 
and no headquarters in Africa itself, and one of its two top 
deputies is a seasoned American diplomat.”
5
  This requires 
AFRICOM to continue to develop integrated strategies 
(civil–military), resource bases (economic, political, and 
military) and tool kits (military and diplomatic capabilities) 
to achieve American objectives with an “approach that 
underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also 
invests heavily in alliances, partnerships and institutions at 
all levels to expand American influence and establish the 




 Driven by strategic necessity, and policy 
considerations of retaining a minimal “footprint” on the 
African continent, the U.S. military has quietly adapted its 
procedures to primarily employ SOF with great 
effectiveness, in conjunction with selected conventional 
forces, to advance AFRICOM initiatives.
7
  At the time of 
this article’s writing, AFRICOM’s only permanent base in 
Africa was Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti, with numerous 
ongoing unclassified and classified missions including 
rotating troops and task forces of some 3,200 troops in 
Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA); 
including 300 Special Operations personnel working on 
                                                           
4
 U.S. AFRICOM PUB AFF. OFF., supra note 2, (quoting General 
William E. “Kip” Ward, former Commander, AFRICOM). 
5
 Eric Schmitt, Libya Crisis Thrusts U.S. Africa Command Into 
Leadership Role, N.Y. TIMES, 




 Richard L. Armitage et al., CSIS Commission on Smart Power, A 
Smarter, More Secure America, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND 
INT’L STUD., 7, (2007), 
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/071106_csissmartpowerreport.pdf. 
7
 Govern, supra note 1, at 294. 
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organizing raids and strategizing the drone strikes of eight 
or more Predator drones “flown” by pilots from thousands 
of miles away, and eight F-15E fighter-bombs for other 
strike operations.
8
  Lemonnier has been described as part of 
a "constellation” of hush-hush [US] drone, commando or 
intelligence facilities in East Africa [including] Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Somalia and the island nation of the Seychelles."
9
  
While DOD has not confirmed or denied those other 
locations, Niger's Ambassador to the US, Maman Sidikou, 
told the media in early 2013 that his government has agreed 
to let US drones operate from its territory, a largely desert 
                                                           
8
 Craig Whitlock, Remote U.S. base at core of secret operations, 




For details of the U.S. Government’s “acknowledged,” unclassified site 
locations in Africa, see LAUREN PLOCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 
34003, AFRICA COMMAND: U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND THE ROLE 
OF THE U.S. MILITARY IN AFRICA 9-10 (2010).  Ploch identified that 
“AFRICOM’s other Forward Operating Site is on the United 
Kingdom’s Ascension Island in the south Atlantic. U.S. military 
facilities in Rota, Spain; Sigonella, Italy; Aruba, Lesser Antilles; Souda 
Bay, Greece; and Ramstein, Germany, serve as logistic support 
facilities. The U.S. military also has access to a number of foreign air 
bases and ports in Africa and has established “bare-bones” facilities 
maintained by local troops in several locations. The U.S. military used 
facilities in Kenya in the 1990s to support its intervention in Somalia 
and continues to use them today to support counterterrorism activities. 
DOD refers to these facilities as ‘lily pads,’ or Cooperative Security 
Locations (CSLs), and has access to locations in Algeria, Botswana, 
Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Namibia, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra 
Leone, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia.” Id. 
9
 Id.; Craig Whitlock & Greg Miller, U.S. assembling secret drone 






nation on the eastern border of Mali.
10
  According to U.S. 
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Commander, 
Admiral (ADM) McRaven, Special Operators will be 
partnering with the State Department and other federal 
agencies, as well as friendly foreign militaries, on 
“nonkinetic”
11
 programs to prevent extremists from 
capitalizing on political discontent, ethnic rivalries and 
economic frustration to fuel their strategy of terror and 
violence in places like Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and 




                                                           
10
 Jamie Crawford & Chris Lawrence, U.S. to base surveillance drones 
in Niger, ambassador says, CNN (Feb. 7, 2013), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/29/us/niger.  
11
 See, e.g., Donald P. Wright et al., ON POINT II, TRANSITION TO THE 
NEW CAMPAIGN:  THE UNITED STATES ARMY IN OPERATION IRAQI 
FREEDOM MAY 2003 –JANUARY 2005 (Combat Studies Institute Press, 
2008), available at 
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps96027/OnPointII.pdf  (“[F]rom the 
very beginning of the full spectrum campaign [in Iraq], US forces also 
mounted broader efforts to build popular support for the new Iraqi 
Government and the Coalition project in Iraq. These operations, 
sometimes called ‘nonkinetic’ operations, concentrated on the 
reconstruction of the Iraqi infrastructure, the establishment of 
representative government, the training of ISF, and general efforts to 
improve the quality of life for the population.”) 
12
 John M. Doyle, Special Operations Forces Face Growing Problems 
in a Shrinking World, INST. FOR DEF. AND GOV’T ADVANCEMENT 




See Admiral William H. McRaven, Posture Statement of Admiral 
William H. McRaven, USN Commander, United States Special 
Operations Command Before The 112
th
 Congress Senate Armed 
Services Committee, ARMED-SERVICES.SENATE.GOV  (Mar. 6, 
2012), 
http://www.senate.gov/~armed_services/statemnt/2012/03%20March/
McRaven%2003-06-12.pdf [hereinafter Posture Statement]. 
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 Inheriting the range of special operations missions 
from Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR),
13
 
and complimenting AFRICOM’s conventional force 
capability, AFRICOM “stood up” a “theater Special 
Operations Command for Africa,” (SOCAFRICA) to 
support the Theater Security Cooperation Program
14
 with 
planning and responding to real world contingencies in 
fifty-three countries and more than 13 million square 
miles.
15
  Also on October 1, 2008, SOCAFRICA assumed 
responsibility for the Special Operations Command and 
Control Element—Horn of Africa,
16
 and on May 15, 2009, 
SOCAFRICA assumed responsibility for Joint Special 
Operations Task Force Trans-Sahara (JSOTFTS)—the SOF 





 The primary focus of the command is on SOF 
missions that develop African partner capacity, provide 
assistance, and support theater security cooperation 
objectives.
18
  For SOCAFRICA, however, as with the 
                                                           
13
 See, e.g., SPEC. OPERATIONS COMMAND EUR., 
http://www.soceur.eucom.mil/default.asp. 
14
 Marina Malenic, Pentagon Begins Constituting Special Operations 
Command to Support AFRICOM Efforts, DEF. DAILY (Oct. 9, 2008), 
http://www.defensedaily.com/publications/dd/4271.html. 
15
 Bryan Purtell, Haas Assumes Command of Special Operations 




 Max Blumenfeld, Training in Trans-Sahara Africa, U.S. AFR. 






 See Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA), 
GLOBALSECURITY,  
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/dod/socafrica.htm (last 
modified Apr. 13, 2013). 
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remainder of AFRICOM assets, the challenge is and will 
remain that its forces must pursue not a unilateral military 
presence or bilateral military– to–military cooperation, but 
a “whole of government approach[,]” which “presents a 
tension between the importance of representing U.S. 
activities in Africa as peaceful and respectful of African 
national sovereignty.”
19
  Collectively and individually, 
African nations will continue to raise many challenges 
surrounding the balance between military power, civil 
society, and the rule of law.
20
  With the goals of the U.S. 
military in mind, questions will necessarily arise as to 
“what success looks like” for both the U.S. and African 





II. The Economic, Political, and Military Challenges 
Faced in Africa 
 
The 2004 U.S. National Military Strategy 
significantly described Africa as lying in “an ‘arc of 
instability’ stretching from the Western Hemisphere, 
through Africa and the Middle East and extending to 
                                                           
19
 John Tierney, Chairman, Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec. and Foreign 
Affairs, Keynote Address at Center for Advanced Defense Studies 
Conference: AFRICOM: An Independent Review for the New 











  Additionally, and similarly troubling, is the 
observation that “[t]here are areas in this arc that serve as 
breeding grounds for threats to [U.S.] interests.”
23
  
Indicative of that regional instability, the U.S. had become 
“increasingly involved in Africa since the end of the Cold 
War,” with over “[twenty] U.S. military operations in 
Africa between 1990 and 2000 and another [ten plus] since 
2000.”
24
  As ADM McRaven identified to Congress, the 
U.S. continues to confront a number of challenges 
from “insurgents, transnational terrorists, criminal 
organizations, nation states and their proxies;” he 
                                                           
22
 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A STRATEGY FOR TODAY; A VISION 
FOR TOMORROW 5 (2004), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/mar2005/d20050318nms.pdf. The 2011 
National Military Strategy (NMS) less pessimistically addressed 
Africa’s “critical states where the threat of terrorism could pose a threat 
to our homeland and interests[,] . . .  violent extremism in the Horn of 
Africa, particularly Somalia and the Trans-Sahel[,] . . .  the security 
threat to innocent civilians[, and the need to] identify and encourage 
states and regional organizations that have demonstrated a leadership 
role to continue to contribute to Africa's security. We will help 
facilitate the African Union’s and the Regional Economic 
Communities’ development of their military capacity, including the 
African Stand-by Force, to address the continent’s many security 
challenges.”  JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, THE NATIONAL MILITARY 
STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: REDEFINING 






 See, e.g., Denine Walters, AFRICOM:  Newsworthiness and Current 
Operations, CONSULTANCY AFR. INTELLIGENCE (Dec. 1, 2009), 
http://www.consultancyafrica.com/index.php?optio 
n=com_content&view=article&id=300&Itemid=202. See also Brett D. 
Schaefer & Mackenzie Eaglen, Clarifying the Future of AFRICOM, 
THE HERITAGE FOUND. n.3 (Sep. 27, 2007), 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Africa/wm1644.cfm (citing Otto 




specified, that these opponents will try to exploit gaps in 
U.S. foreign and defense policies that were developed in a 
more predictable world, with their use of cyberspace as a 
battlefield making them more adaptable as they seek new 
ways to recruit, train, finance, and operate.
25
  In Africa and 
elsewhere, “the strategic environment is changing — 
quickly and constantly.”
26
  At greatest risk in Africa are 
“weakly governed spaces [that] provide favorable operating 
environments for violent extremism, piracy, and trafficking 
of humans, weapons, and drugs.”
27
  Similarly, numerous 
other nations with duly constituted governments employ 
cronyism and favoritism to manipulate the organs of law 
enforcement and judicial systems, or flaunt international 
efforts to advance and promote justice. Rule of law and 
human rights challenges include, but are not limited to, the 
following in some twenty-first century African nations, 
governmental entities, organizations, and cultures: 
 
Undeveloped economies, 
with limited resource bases 
and insufficient employment 
and income opportunities for 
large segments of the 
                                                           
25
 Posture Statement, supra note 13. 
26
 Id.  
27
 2010 POSTURE STATEMENT U.S. AFRICA COMMAND, U.S. 
AFR. COMMAND, (Mar. 9, 2010), 
http://www.africom.mil/Content/CustomPages/ResearchPage/pdfFiles/
USAFRICOM2010PostureStatement.pdf. In his March 9, 2010 
testimony before Congress, the then-commander of AFRICOM 
provided an overview of the strategic environment in Africa, explained 
AFRICOM’s strategic approach, and showed how security cooperation 
efforts promote stability in support of U.S. foreign policy and national 
security objectives. See id. It is noteworthy that these Annual Posture 
Statements seldom, if ever, include “metrics” related to “measures of 
success,” identifying instead, anecdotal instances of mission successes 
and efficacy. See id. 
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High population growth rates 
further strain the natural 
environment and local 





Ethnic diversity or regional 
factionalism promoting local 
or particularistic 
identifications, while 





Ethnic or class politics 
involving competition among 
leaders of different language, 
cultural, or regional 
populations for state 
positions of political and 
economic power with the 





Lack of regime legitimacy, as 
those large segments of the 
                                                           
28
 Paul J. Magnarella, Preventing Interethnic Conflict and Promoting 
Human Rights through More Effective Legal, Political, and Aid 
Structures: Focus on Africa, 23 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 327 (1993), 
cited with authority in Paul J. Magnarella, Achieving Human Rights in 










population not culturally or 
politically affiliated with the 
ruling elite and not sharing in 
the spoils, refuse to recognize 




Resort to military or police 
force to maintain power by 
suppressing political 





Violation of economic, civil, 
and political rights by the 





Openly mocking human 
rights and democracy, aside 
from corruption and 





 What should success look like for SOCAFRICA 
and conventional force engagement of African forces and 
governments?  According to the House of Representatives’ 
yearly assessment of AFRICOM, national security is a 
stable environment “where education and public health 
efforts, improvements in the rule of law, and the reduction 
of corruption can significantly increase a government’s 








 See, e.g., Afr. Action and Foreign Policy in Focus Staff, Africa 




ability to combat these new threats.”  In summation, 
AFRICOM’s “foremost mission is to help Africans achieve 
their own security” and to support African leadership 
efforts,
36
 yet, “they will welcome help in building strong, 




III. Surveying SOCAFRICA Efforts to Promote 
Human Rights and Rule of Law 
 
 Part of the SOF “smart power” approach to Africa 
will involve a mix of direct and indirect approaches to 
promote stability and security, advancing human rights, and 
the rule of law.  In advancing rule of law principles in 
Africa, we might look to what the U.S. Department of State 
(DoS) has attempted to define for Congress as notions of 
rule of law the U.S. encourages and promotes: 
 
 While there is no commonly agreed upon definition 
for the rule of law, we take it to mean a broad spectrum of 
activities including a constitution, legislation, a court 
system and courthouses, a judiciary, police, lawyers and 
legal assistance, due process procedures, prisons, a 
commercial code, and anticorruption activities. To 
successfully implement an emerging rule of law, these 
activities must proceed somewhat sequentially and not 
                                                           
36
 John J. Kruzel, Pentagon Official Describes AFRICOM’s Mission, 
Dispels Misconceptions, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Aug. 3, 2007), 
http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=46931.  
37
 Judith Snyderman, AFRICOM Helps African Nations Build Their 








According to ADM McRaven, the direct approach 
will remain a hallmark capability for SOF in order to 
provide the necessary means to disrupt this threat, while it 
ultimately only buys time and space for the indirect 
approach and broader governmental elements to take 
effect.
39
  Less well known but decisive in importance, “the 
indirect approach includes empowering host nation forces, 
providing appropriate assistance to humanitarian agencies, 
and engaging key populations; these long-term efforts 
increase partner capabilities to generate sufficient security 
and rule of law, address local needs, and advance ideas that 
discredit and defeat the appeal of violent extremism.”
40
 
As an effort to advance U.S.–African cooperation and the 
rule of law in African states, the first Africa Military Legal 
Conference hosted by AFRICOM concluded on May 21, 
2010, at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping 
Training Center in Accra, Ghana.  This conference brought 
together legal experts from fifteen African nations to 
discuss common challenges, including military justice and 
                                                           
38
 Howard J. Krongard, House Committee on Government Reform 
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and 
International Relations: Testimony of Howard J. Krongard Inspector 
General U.S. Department of State and Broadcasting Board of 
Governors, OIG.STATE.GOV (Oct. 18, 2005), available at 
http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/55371.pdf.  Note: the 
context of this testimony before Congress was ongoing rule of law 
initiatives in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Domestically, as well as 
internationally, it is far from settled how to define “rule of law,” let 
alone how to bring it about.  See, e.g., Kevin Govern, Rethinking Rule 









maritime law, and counter-narcotics authorities.
41
  Major 
Joy Primoli of 17th Air Force (Air Forces Africa) and 
Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Tuckey of U.S. Army Africa, 
led a discussion about the U.S. military justice system and 
discussed challenges that common law countries face in 
applying military disciplinary rules to maintain good order 
and discipline while ensuring that unlawful command 
influence does not corrupt the system.
42
  Countries using 
civilian justice systems for military offenses discussed 
challenges in case processing, including the lack of 
resources to dispense timely justice.
43
   
 
 SOF and conventional forces have been involved in 
promoting, as well as conducting in Africa and elsewhere, 
the International Military Education and Training (IMET) 
program that provides funds for international personnel to 
attend U.S. military professional training programs.
44
  The 
IMET program “specifically targets current and future 
military and civilian leadership in African nations” and 
“exposes foreign students to U.S. professional military 
organizations and procedures and the manner in which 
military organizations function under civilian control.”
45
  
AFRICOM highlights that its IMET programs introduce 
students to “elements of U.S. democracy such as the U.S. 
judicial system, legislative oversight, free speech, equality 
issues, and U.S. commitment to human rights” and 
                                                           
41
 Kathleen A. Duignan, Successful Completion of First Africa Military 







 U.S. AFRICOM PUB. AFF. OFF., Newsroom Documents March 2012, 
U.S. AFR. COMMAND, Fact Sheet:  International Military Education 
and Training (Jan. 2012), 
http://www.africom.mil/NEWSROOM/Document/8841 [hereinafter 





promotes force interoperability through “IMET’s 
mandatory English-language proficiency requirement.”
46
  
Of no small significance “IMET training graduates fill key 
leadership positions in military of many African nations.”
47
  
There is also irony in this observation, given that Malian 
coup leader Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo received 
extensive IMET training in the United States between 2004 
and 2010 before leading a military coup of his nation in 
2012.
48
  Funding for U.S. Africa Command IMET recipient 
countries in Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 was $21.6 million.
49
  
Projected funding for FY 2012 is $20.4 million.
50
  In FY 
2011, 1,292 students from forty-seven partner nations 
throughout Africa participated in IMET-funded training 
and educational opportunities.
51
  With IMET, as with other 
development and assistance programs, it is the sense of 
Congress that if a country does “not cooperate with the 
United States on terrorism or narcotics enforcement, is a 
gross violator of the human rights of its citizens, or is 
engaged in conflict or spends excessively on its military,” 





 Other examples of the indirect approach are SOF’s 
contributions supporting interagency diplomacy and 
development efforts.  Currently, Military Information 
Support Teams (MIST) and Regional Information Support 
Teams (RIST) support the Department of State by 
augmenting and broadening their public diplomacy 
                                                           
46
 Id.  
47
 Id.  
48
 See Adam Nossiter, Leaders of Mali’s Military Coup Seem to have 
Uncertain Grasp on Power, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2012, at A8. 
49
 Fact Sheet: Int’l Military Educ. and Training, supra note 45. 
50




 See, e.g., Sense Of The Congress Regarding Comprehensive Debt 





  MIST elements are requested by U.S. Chiefs of 
Mission and work under their direction to blend the 
embassy’s Mission Strategic Plan and the Geographic 
Combatant Commander’s (GCC) Theater Campaign Plan.  
SOF elements in AFRICOM and elsewhere also support 
interagency development efforts by deploying civil–
military support elements (CMSE) to address refugees, 
displaced persons, populations at risk, and humanitarian or 
disaster assistance.
54
  In addition to their work in the Trans-
Sahel, “CMSEs are engaged in seventeen countries and are 
forecasted to expand to twenty countries in FY 2013 and 
more than thirty countries by FY 2017” to “support 





 The U.S. Department of State, Africa Bureau has 
administered various peacekeeping capacity-building 
assistance programs since the mid-1990s: the 1996 African 
Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) program from 1996 
                                                           
53
 U.S. AFRICOM PUB. AFF. OFF., Newsroom Documents March 2012, 
U.S. AFR. COMMAND Fact Sheet: Military Information Support Team 





AFRICOM POSTURE STATEMENT: Ward Reports Annual Testimony 




 See Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans-Sahara (OEF –TS), 
GLOBALSECURITY, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oef-
ts.htm, (last modified Jan. 24, 2013).  
55
 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 and 
Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Armed Serv., 112
th
 Cong. 86 (2012) (statement of Admiral 




through 2004 evolved into the African Contingency 
Operations Training and Assistance program (ACOTA) in 
2004, then into the Global Peace Operations Initiative 
(GPOI) in 2005.
56
  The ACRI was designed, according to 
the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, “[t]o enhance the 
capacity of African partner nations to effectively participate 
in multinational peace support operations,” or in other 
words, to improve the training and effectiveness of African 
military forces.
57
  The goal of these programs has been “to 
increase the capabilities of these militaries in areas such as 
human rights, interaction with civil society, international 
law, military staff skills, and small unit operations.”
58
  
According to Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Vicki 
                                                           
56
 See Africa Crisis Response Initiative, GLOBAL SECURITY, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/acri.htm (last visited Jan. 
31, 2013); see also NINA SERAFINO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 
32773, THE GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS INITIATIVE: BACKGROUND 
AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 3 (2009).  Serafino notes on this 
transmogrification of Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) to 
African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program 
(ACOTA) that “[b]efore mid-2004, the United States provided 
peacekeeping capacity-building assistance to foreign militaries 
primarily under two programs, the African Contingency Operations 
Training and Assistance program (ACOTA) and its predecessor 
program, and the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities 
program (EIPC). Both ACOTA and EPIC have been subsumed under 
the [Global Peace Operations Initiative] GPOI budget line. ACOTA is 
still the term used to refer to the Africa component of GPOI, however, 
and is implemented by the State Department’s Africa Bureau. Overall 
responsibility for GPOI rests with the State Department Bureau of 
Political-Military Affairs’ Office of Plans, Policy, and Analysis 
(PM/PPA). (Information about GPOI is available at 
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/gpoi.) PM/PPA works closely with 
DOD offices to plan and carry out the program.” Id. 
57
 U.S. Government Donates Utility Vehicles to the Nigerian Army, 
U.S. DIPLOMATIC MISSION TO NIGERIA (Oct. 24, 2008), 
http://nigeria.usembassy.gov/prog_10242008.html. 
58
 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Africa Crisis Response Initiative 




Huddleston, “[b]y training professional military units that 
respect civilian control, these militaries become important 
contributors to stability and respect for the rule of law,” 
while AFRICOM’s exercises “provide opportunities to 
African partners to continue perfecting their professional 
abilities.”
59
   Huddleston said such training consists of 
international standards on human rights, including respect 
for the rule of law, tolerance, and women’s rights.
60
 
SOF pursuing ACOTA and other missions must be 
conscious of unique and intensifying politico-military “turf 
issues” and human rights concerns in Africa, since “U.S. 
military resources and projects are crossing ministerial 
lines across the continent.”
61
  Retired Foreign Service 
Officer Robert Gribben points to the theoretical “key local 
client for AFRICOM” as being the host Ministry of 
Defense, yet the additional realities are that “U.S. military 
resources already go to projects in ministries of water 
development, women’s affairs, health, [interior, and] 
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FOREIGN SERVICE J. 25, (2008); Theresa Whelan, Transcript:  
Pentagon Africa Policy Chief Whelan Describes U.S. Objectives For 
Africa Command, U.S. AFR. COMMAND (Feb. 18, 2008), 
http://www.africom.mil/getArticle.asp?art=1663 (“There are a number 
of pieces of legislation -- one of them for example is the Leahy 
Amendment, which requires human rights vetting of every single 
individual we train. Even if we’re training a large unit, every individual 
in that unit has to be vetted as best we can with the information that we 
have for human rights violations to anyone that there is even the 
smallest bit of suspicion about is removed from the training program.”); 
See also.  Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-133 (1996) (discussing 
certain human rights abuses by host nations may trigger restrictions on 





  This means it is not enough for SOF to vet 
military compliance with human rights considerations and 
promote military capabilities; they must also do so for 
civilian ministries.  
 
 SOCAFRICA and other component commands and 
AFRICOM assets must integrate their efforts with the AU, 
a key partner, despite the fact that the AU faces a crisis of 
legitimacy such that “[t]he AU is being judged on whether 
it can and will respond effectively to situations of armed 
conflict [under the provisions of the AU Constitutive 
Act].”
63
  The AU Constitutive Act states that the Union has 
the right to intervene “in a Member State pursuant to a 
decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, 
namely war crimes, genocide[,] and crimes against 
humanity.”
64
  They must support AU’s initiatives to build 
legitimacy and the rule of law, including the “alphabet 
soup” of allied coalitions, such as: Global Peace Operations 
Initiative (GPOI), Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program 
(ATAP), Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership 
(TSCTP), East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI), 
ACOTA, and IMET, the African Coastal Security Program, 
Foreign Military Financing, the AU Standby Force, the 
Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center, 
the Military Personnel Exchange Program, the Regional 
Defense Combat Terrorism (CT) Fellowship Program, and 
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the National Guard Bureau State Partnership Program.
65
  
Just as the AU is “being judged on whether the presence of 
AU or regional peacekeeping forces can resolve complex 
peace support or enforcement operations,” so too will 
SOCAFRICA and other AFRICOM assets be judged.
66
  
The primary thrust of U.S. targeted killings, particularly 
through drone strikes, has been on al-Qaeda and Taliban 
leadership networks in Afghanistan and the remote tribal 
regions of Pakistan.
67
  However, U.S. operations are 
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 Jonathan Masters, Targeted Killings, CFR (Jan. 8, 2013), 
http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/targeted-killings/p9627.   
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continuing to expand in Horn of Africa countries such as 




IV.  “Modeling what Right Looks Like” and the 
Consequences when that Doesn’t Happen 
 
 I have previously proposed Measures of 
Effectiveness (MOE) for AFRICOM,
69
 addressing 
Congressional concerns about each key aspect of force 
composition, resourcing, and missions, at a time when 
AFRICOM was still forming such standards and assessing 
“lessons learned.
70
  In hindsight, the outgoing first deputy 
to the commander for military operations, Vice Admiral 
(VADM) Robert Moeller, (Retired (RET)) said, “during 
[the command’s] work in designing AFRICOM and 
helping guide it through the early years of its existence, a 
number of lessons have helped inform our decisions and 
ensure we performed our job responsibly and effectively.”
71
  
Those “lessons learned” have equal applicability to 
SOCAFRICA as AFRICOM’s sub-unified command: 
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Lesson 1: AFRICOM does 
not create policy. 
 
Lesson 2: AFRICOM must 
work hand in hand with the 
diplomatic corps. 
 
Lesson 3: Keep our footprint 
in Africa limited. 
 
Lesson 4: AFRICOM is most 
effective when it listens to 
the concerns of its African 
partners. 
 





 Each of these aspects contribute to a long-term 
vision AFRICOM shares with its African partners, building 
capabilities through sustained security programs which, 
“over time, help support the conditions for economic 
development, social development, and improvements in 
health -- so that people will continue to see progress in their 
lives and growing prosperity in their communities.”
73
   
Even when these “lessons learned” are heeded, and best 
efforts are made to assess and promote adherence to the 
highest legal and operational standards, some resulting 
circumstances may fall short where exemplifying and 
educating “what right looks like” does not happen.  For 
instance, Malian Army Captain and coup leader Sanogo 
“attended an English-language instructor course at the 
Defense Language Institute, a special school for 







international military students at Lackland Air Force Base, 
Texas, from August 2004 to February 2005,” then “[n]early 
three years later, in December 2007, Captain Sanogo 
returned to the United States, this time for more English 
language classes at Lackland before attending the Army’s 
entry-level course for intelligence officers at Fort 
Huachuca, Arizona, instruction that he completed in July 
2008.”
74
  Did IMET and other training enhance Sanogo’s 
ability to plot and conduct his coup, or deter him from 
committing greater human rights violations than he is 
accused of having committed?  Only time and careful 
consideration will tell, as the “green arc of instability” from 
the Sahel to the Horn of Africa becomes less stable through 
this forcible revolt.
75
   
 
 SOF must also scrupulously demonstrate the highest 
legal, ethical, and moral standards in their personal and 
professional conduct.  What better way to hold the “high 
ground” and to encourage those being trained and those 
advised to do likewise?  Regrettably, as negative exemplars 
for African forces and nations within the Area of 
Responsibility (AOR), come the consequences of 
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of this writing, he has been a continuing obstacle to efforts by the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).”  See Mark 
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 Arc of instability in Africa may turn into battlefield – Moscow’s 
envoy, RT (Mar. 27, 2012), http://rt.com/politics/mali-africa-arab-
spring-538/.  Mikhail Margelov, the Kremlin’s special envoy to Africa 
stressed, “A ‘green arc of instability’ is being formed from the 
Sahel (the region bordering the Sahara Desert) to the Horn of 
Africa. Therefore careful monitoring of events in the region is 
necessary not to allow the transformation of this arc into a 
battlefield.”  Id.  
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unprofessionalism and criminal misconduct by 
AFRICOM’s highest uniformed leaders.  Pentagon 
inspector general investigators found that former 
AFRICOM Commander, Lieutenant General (LTG) Ward 
(formerly General (GEN)) spent thousands of dollars on 
inappropriate travel expenses,
76
 and engaged in several 
"inappropriate" activities, including “submitting expense 
reports with extravagant and unacceptable charges, 
inappropriate use of military staff, and misuse of 
government funds,” involving "not an insignificant sum of 
money;" as a result, Ward was relieved of command (fired), 
demoted in rank affecting his lifetime pension, and had a 
recoupment of $82,000.
77
  Less than six months after 
Ward’s relief, his outgoing replacement, GEN Carter Ham, 
head of AFRICOM, relieved Major General (MG) Ralph 
Baker, commander of the CJTF-HOA in Djibouti, of 
command on April 4, 2013 and fined Baker a portion of his 
pay after an administrative hearing and review.
78
   
AFRICOM officials said Ham lost confidence in Baker's 
ability to command because of alcohol and sexual 
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 Barbara Starr, Four-star general faces demotion over misspending 
allegations, CNN (Aug. 15, 2012, 6:42PM), 
http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/08/15/four-star-general-faces-
demotion-over-misspending-allegations.  According to CNN, “Ward 
went through a public retirement ceremony from Africa Command in 
April of last year, but did not retire pending the outcome of the 
investigation. Since leaving Africa Command, he has worked in an 
Army staff job out of the limelight, serving as a two-star general. Under 
Army guidelines, a four-star who is not serving at that rank for 60 days 
is automatically demoted until the case is resolved.” Id. 
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 GEN David M. Rodriguez, one of the Army’s most 
battle-tested officers, assumed command of AFRICOM in 
April 2013 as Africa confronts a growing threat from 
Islamic militant groups operating across the continent, and 
refocuses AFRICOM on core missions, implementing 
lessons learned, and setting and maintaining the highest 
professional and personal standards of conduct.
80
  He will 
need to implement strategies to face threats while 
simultaneously setting and maintaining the highest 
professional and personal standards of conduct. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
 SOCAFRICA has even greater challenges than 
conventional forces in the AFRICOM AOR regarding 
physical and political risk, operational techniques, modes 




 John Vandiver, Rodriguez, experienced in Afghanistan, becomes new 
AFRICOM boss, STARS AND STRIPES (Apr. 5, 2013), 
http://www.stripes.com/news/rodriguez-experienced-in-afghanistan-
becomes-new-africom-boss-1.215169; Claudette Roulo, Rodriguez 
Succeeds Ham as Africom Commander, DEFENSE.GOV (Apr. 5, 2013), 
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119699.  
Rodriguez’s vast experience included commands of joint, combined 
and interagency operations comprised of conventional forces (heavy 
armored and airborne light infantry), as well as SOF (Ranger) units. 
Vandiver, supra; See also Roulo, supra. Rodriguez’s predecessor, as a 
tribute to outgoing the outgoing AFRICOM Commander, General 
Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, lauded Ham 
for “principled and grounded leadership,” and for his “steady hand 
when times felt very unsteady.” Vandiver, supra; See also Roulo, 
supra.  These comments may have alluded as much to Ham’s decisive 
and successful operational efforts as to his restoring a command 
climate of dignity and respect as well as military discipline and 
adherence to professional ethics. 
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of employment, and dependence on detailed operational 
intelligence and indigenous assets; given operational and 
training element sizes, locations, defensive postures, and 
close engagement with local populaces; and African 
government personnel, and host nation military forces.
81
  
SOF furtherance of human rights and the rule of law, in 
every instance, can and must be considered in light of 
VADM (RET) Moeller’s “lessons learned,” but also 
measured against and meet the Five SOF Mission Criteria:   
 
It must be an appropriate 
mission or activity for SOF.  
The mission or activities 
should support the Joint 
Force Commander’s (JFC’s) 
campaign or operation plan, 
or special activities.  Mission 
or tasks must be operationally 
feasible, approved, and fully 
coordinated.  Required 
resources must be available 
to execute and support the 
SOF mission.  The expected 
outcome of the mission must 
justify the risks.
82
   
 
 As I have previously written, the effective use of 
SOF will likely mean fewer in extremis requirements for 
direct action or targeted killing of terrorists and other 
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persons threatening U.S. national security like bin Laden.
83
  
SOCAFRICA will play an indispensible role in aiding 
African nations with “foreign internal defense” missions; 
that is, “participation by civilian and military agencies of a 
government in any of the action programs taken by another 
government or other designated organization to free and 
protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, 
insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.”
84
  
As challenges in Africa arise and continue, so too will 
AFRICOM’s need for SOF increase, utilizing these highly 
trained, culturally astute, superbly disciplined uniformed 
service members to promote and maintain a vigilant and 
active peace.
85
  In this manner, rather than targeting the 
symptomatic expressions of terror, the United States will 
instead prescriptively promote the rule of law abroad as one 
of many measures to eliminate the root causes of terrorism, 
while maintaining the capability to deliberately and 
carefully tailor uses of authorized, licit force around the 
world. 
 
Operating in joint, combined, and interagency 
operations, SOCAFRICA can and will promote 
“democracy, opportunity, health, and the peaceful 
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 as SOF “diplomat-warriors” 
coordinate and synchronize U.S. military activities with 
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